Institutional Biosafety Committee Meeting
10/21/2026
10:30am via Zoom
Virtual Meeting

Institutional Biosafety Committee Meeting minutes

Meeting Attendance:

- Members in attendance:
  - Elena Demireva
  - Rhia LeVeque
  - Jonathan Hardy
  - Guo-Qing Song
  - Dave Morgan
  - Michael Bachmann

- Members not in attendance:
  - Jamie Willard-Smith
  - Jan Patterson Samson
  - Carrie Anglewicz
  - Andras Komaromy
  - Carolina de Aguiar Ferreira
  - Raj Kulkarni

- Others in attendance:
  - Sarah Roosa
  - Alessandra Hunt
  - Luis Ochoa Carrera

Call to order:

  - Elena Demireva

Roll call:

  - Sarah Roosa

Discussion of the agenda:

- Approved

Discussion of minutes:

- Approved

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Registration review:

Study Info

SAFETY0001524: [redacted]
Tumor microenvironment and drug discovery
Training: Complete for all members listed
NIH III-D, RG-2, BSL-2+
This registration has been approved with edits. The PI has been asked to clarify the following

- Viruses or Prions
  - 1: Please remove the mention of 2nd generation lentiviruses if they are not used in the project. The rest of the submission mentions only 3rd generation lentivirus. The use of 3rd generation lentivirus is recommended when expressing oncogenes.
  - 1: Biocontainment level can be changed to BSL-2 if only 3rd generation lentiviruses are used.
  - 1: The Committee asks that the laboratory consider outsourcing lentivirus production to a commercial vendor specializing in viral vector manufacturing. For many laboratories, this can be a cost-effective and time-efficient approach that provides high-quality materials, while reducing the operational demands associated with in-house vector production.
- Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acids Usage
  - 3c: CRIP1 is listed in 3b as having unknown function. Are there possible oncogenic properties that led to CRIP1 being added in 3c?
  - 4e: Provide more safety feature information for 3rd generation lentivirus – e.g. self-inactivating, 3' LTR deletion.
- Exposure Assessment and Protective Equipment
  - 4: The Committee asks that the laboratory consider switching to plastic Pasteur pipettes for work containing oncogenes.
- Supporting Documents
  - 1: If BSL-2+ Biological Research Standards will be implemented in the lab, please attach a document outlining what measures are taken above BSL-2 standards to classify the lab as BSL-2+.
  - 1: Add needles without safety feature and scalpels to the safer sharps annual review. When you are not using safer sharps on materials that have the possibility of having bloodborne pathogens you must justify your reasoning in the annual review.

Study Info

SAFETY0001528: [redacted]
CRISPR in iPSCs
Training: Complete for all members listed

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NIH III-D, RG-2, BSL-2
This registration has been approved with edits. [redacted] abstained.
The PI has been asked to clarify the following

- Basic Information
  - 3: Remove viral transduction as a method of DNA template delivery.
- Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acids Usage
  - 3a: Remove redundant "Project 1:"

Study Info

SAFETY0001531: [redacted]

Transgenic Mosquitoes
Training: Complete for all members listed
NIH III-D, RG-2, BSL-2
This registration has been approved with edits. The PI has been asked to clarify the following

- Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Work Description
  - 2: Add Anopheles coluzzii as a recipient organism
- Supporting Documents
  - 1: Please attach the Animal Containment Level 2 SOP for Dr. [redacted] laboratory.

Study Info

SAFETY0001532: [redacted]

Protein production and characterization
Training: Complete for all members listed
NIH III-E, RG-1, BSL-1
This registration has been approved with edits. The PI has been asked to clarify the following

- Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acids Usage
  - 3c: Please link the genes in 3b to the nomenclature in 3c. An excel document with all insert information could be attached in Supporting Documents.
- Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Work Description
  - 2: Remove all, as there are no recipients
- Exposure Assessment and Protective Equipment
  - 1: Please include acknowledgment that some individuals may react to the allergen proteins.
  - 5: Include the units for contact time of disinfectants (minutes).
- Waste Management/Environmental Release Controls
  - 1: Will you have liquid waste to decontaminate? If so, select the liquid waste option and indicate the decontamination method (10% Bleach for 10 min)

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Study Info

SAFETY0001535: [redacted]
Engineering plant roots
Training: Complete for all members listed
NIH III-E, RG-1, BSL-1
This registration has been approved without edits.

Study Info

SAFETY0001536: [redacted]
Salmonella surface structures and detection
Training: Complete for all members listed
NIH III-D, RG-2, BSL-2
This registration has been approved with edits. The PI has been asked to clarify the following

- Bacteria, Yeasts, Fungi, or Parasites
  - 1: Add E. coli if used for cloning in house
- Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acids Usage
  - 5: Change to yes if using E. coli for cloning
- Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Work Description
  - 6: Change to yes for use of Salmonella

Study Info

SAFETY0001538: [redacted]
[redacted] **– rDNA newt bacteria 2026**
Training: Complete for all members listed
NIH III-E, RG-2, BSL-2
This registration has been approved with edits. The PI has been asked to clarify the following

- Biosafety Summary
  - 2: Clarify which strains from newt skin are known to produce TTX
  - 2: Is the TTX gene transmitted between bacterial species via conjugation or other mechanisms?
  - 2: How do you monitor the amount of TTX you have stored in the lab produced by bacteria?
- Bacteria, Yeasts, Fungi, or Parasites
  - 1: Remove Aeromonas from the Other line, as it is already listed in the table
  - 1: Separate the Other materials so they have their own lines, and add strains for each
- Toxins, Agricultural Pathogens, or Select Agents
  - 1: Add another line for TTX extracted from bacteria

    - 1: The IBC must be contacted if a mutation enhances TTX production (1ug/ml or more) or if the lab is nearing the 500mg total TTX.
- Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acids Usage
    - 10: Ethanol is not effective against tetrodotoxin. Bleach can be used to disinfect surfaces with proper dilution and contact time.
- Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Work Description
    - 6: Select Yes for use of Pseudomonas and Aeromonas.
- Note that this is a possible DGOF submission
    - Add to a list of submissions to review when new Guidelines on Dangerous Gain of Function are finalized.
    - Lab must stay up to date on all training and edit Team Members promptly.

Study Info

SAFETY0001540: [redacted]

Genetic studies of Caulobacter, Bradyrhizobium and Bacteriodes
Training: Complete for all members listed
NIH III-F, RG-2, BSL-2
This registration has been approved with edits. The PI has been asked to clarify the following

- Biosafety Summary
    - 2: Clarify in which species each gene will either be knocked out or overexpressed.
- Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acids Usage
    - 2: Change to III-D1 for use of Risk Group 2 agents
- Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Work Description
    - 6: Yes, for the use of Bacteroides fragilis, which is an opportunistic pathogen
- Exposure Assessment and Protective Equipment
    - 1: Include information about Bacteroides fragilis, which is an opportunistic pathogen
    - 3: Change Biosafety cabinet certification date to the most recent date it was certified. A future date cannot be used.
- Supporting Documents:
    - Provide sharps evaluation documents if sharps used with Bacteroides

Study Info

SAFETY0001541: [redacted]

Generation of stable ChR-2 expressing human iPSCs
Training: Complete for all members listed
NIH III-D, RG-2, BSL-2
This registration has been approved with edits. The PI has been asked to clarify the following

- Viruses or Prions

    - 1: The Committee asks that the laboratory consider outsourcing lentivirus production to a commercial vendor specializing in viral vector manufacturing. For many laboratories, this can be a cost-effective and time-efficient approach that provides high-quality materials, while reducing the operational demands associated with in-house vector production.
- Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acids Usage
    - 8: Please remove non-relevant information (shRNA, CRISPR sgRNA, oncogenes, etc.)
    - 9: Please remove information about chemical exposure and physical harm and replace with Biosafety Exposure Response information.
- Supporting Documents
    - 1: Please update the safer sharps form. Fill out the evaluation forms for any safer sharps used in the lab. Are you still using the Re-Cap it device listed in the 2023 Safer Sharps Form? If so, please fill out an evaluation form for them.

Study Info

SAMENDCR00000026: [redacted]

Study the emission, transport, and decay of airborne microorganisms in indoor environment

Training: Complete for all members listed

BMR, RG-2, BSL-2+

Approval for this submission has been withheld until further review. After clarification from the PI the submission will be reviewed by the full IBC again. The PI has been asked to clarify the following

- Biosafety Summary
    - 2: The Committee strongly recommends using a surrogate or attenuated virus in place of the replication-competent virus.
    - 2: Please provide a protocol on how viruses are extracted from the HEPA filter in the rotating drum exhaust. This can be added as a separate document in Supporting Documents.
    - 2: After sampling from the rotating drum, how are viruses tested for viability?
    - 2: If the laboratory still wishes to use replication-competent virus the committee would like more information on:
        - Please provide more details on why a surrogate or attenuated virus cannot be used.
        - Could a biobubble be used for containment of biological materials?
        - Is there an external expert or NIH contact who can review and consult on the procedure with the rotating drum apparatus?
    - 2: Provide more details on how the virus will be grown and purified. Include more details on how the virus is handled when loading into the rotating drum.
    - 2: Please provide a protocol for collection of HVAC filters on campus. This can be attached as a separate document in Supporting Documents

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        - How are the filters collected for the experiment vs. how they are normally collected?
        - Are IPF staff trained for filter collection?
        - Provide more details on how the filters are vacuumed, how the samples are processed, and disposal of filters.
        - An HVAC consultant may need to be contacted.
    - 2: The far-UV experiment should include an engineering-safety review because 222-nm UV exposure is a physical hazard independent of the biological risk. The system should have shielding, interlocks, exposure monitoring where indicated, warning signage, and procedures preventing personnel exposure during operation or maintenance
- Viruses or Prions
    - 1: Please specify what strain of H1N1 you are planning to use as there are multiple strains.
- Exposure Assessment and Protective Equipment
    - 1: Include death as a possible consequence of exposure to H1N1 virus.
    - 5: Is bleach used as a disinfectant on the metal rotating drum apparatus? A hydrogen peroxide disinfectant or vaporizer may be a better option for disinfection of the equipment and space.
- Supporting Documents
    - 1: Please provide more information on the rotating drum apparatus.
        - Who manufactured the apparatus? Are there references or papers from other groups who have used something similar? If so, what containment and safety measures were in place when using the device?

New Items:

Previous Submissions:

- SAFETY0001211[redacted]

Next Meeting:

- Friday November 13, 2026 at 10:30am